



NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

Office of the UN Resident & Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia

UNCT Workshop

Engagement with Somali Authorities

- 1) The UNCT met on 14 June to discuss and agree a strategic approach to UN engagement with Somalia. The issues, recommendations and action points issuing from this meeting are listed below in paragraph 3.

2) Context

- a) Somalia provides a unique challenge in aid coordination. In the medium term the country requires the concurrent and continual delivery of a large and complex mix of relief, recovery, and development assistance in a deeply insecure and unpredictable operating environment. Since its establishment the TFG has struggled to coalesce into a functioning unit that can deliver any level of service to Somalis or establish any level of popular support. This situation was further complicated in the last two months with the emergence of the Sharia law courts as a major military and political force in the centre and south of Somalia.
- b) In early 2006, the Islamic clerical courts long-established in Mogadishu formed a political and religious union known as the Islamic Court's Union and in June 2006 engaged in a period of bloody fighting with a union of foreign supported warlords known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. After defeating the Alliance, they rapidly moved to claim military and political control of substantial parts of southern Somalia moving northwards to Jowhar. Belet Weyne on the border with Ethiopia subsequently conceded military control to the ICU. At the time of writing, this has sparked a flurry of diplomatic activity amongst the international community and TFG aimed primarily at shoring up the position of the TFG and to assess the nature and ambitions of the ICU. Notably, the TFG Parliament voted to allow a foreign peace keeping mission in Somalia. However, the viability of the peacekeeping mission is dependent on establishing an exception to or lifting of the UN arms embargo against Somalia.
- c) The League of Arab States facilitated a meeting on 22 June 2006 between the TFG and ICU in Khartoum at which the two sides signed a non aggression pact in which they agreed to recognize one another and further engage in peaceful negotiations. In addition an International Contact Group has been established in New York. Recent events illustrate the rapidly fluctuating context in which the UN has to plan and deliver development assistance to Somalia. *Until the dust begins to settle the UN continues to plan its activity on the basis of having an internationally supported and viable national counterpart in the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.*
- d) A further problem that continues to prove intractable at the political level is the self-declared independence of northwest Somalia ("Somaliland"). In recent years, while this proved a thorny issue with regard to the delivery of assistance it was not an immutable obstacle. Aid agencies primarily dealt with local authorities and community based organisations (including the authorities in Somaliland) as their field counterparts. However, with the recent focus on capacity building of national institutions and the imminent arrival of a comprehensive government owned development plan for Somalia (the RDP) there is a danger that this part of Somalia which has achieved a laudable level of peace and security becomes marginalised and more sensitive to the issue (so blocking the further delivery of assistance). *In this regard the UNRHC depends on the good offices of UNPOS and to this end facilitated a recent meeting in Hargeisa between the authorities and UNSRSG.*
- e) The end of the peace and reconciliation conference in August 2004 created a critical opportunity to achieve peace and security, promote governance and the rule of law, begin recovery, reconstruction and development, reverse regression from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and advance

sustainable socio-economic development throughout Somalia. The international community committed itself through the Stockholm Declaration (November 2004) to *a shared coordination framework, a shared set of priorities for peace building, reconciliation, reconstruction and development and a combined donor response*. The UN jointly chairs (with the TFG and the World Bank) the highest level of this structure (the Coordination Monitoring Committee) through the office of the UNSRSG and at the operational level (Joint Planning Committee) through the Office of the UNRHC.

- f) In response to the opportunity offered by the establishment of the Transitional Federal Charter and the TFI, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the International Community requested the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the World Bank (WB) to co-lead and prepare for a Somali Joint Needs Assessment (JNA). The JNA is an inclusive development planning process for all key stakeholders in Somalia. Its aim is to kick start recovery in Somalia. Initially scheduled for six months it is now due to complete its work in July 2006. The output of the JNA is a fully-costed results-based comprehensive development framework for Somalia to be used in mobilizing, distributing and coordinating international recovery assistance during the specified period of time. This is known as the Reconstruction and Development Plan for Somalia (RDP) 2006-2011 inclusive.
- g) Despite the optimism garnered from the end of the peace conference in 2004 the reality that aid workers continue to face in the centre and south of Somalia is a complex humanitarian emergency. Since December 2005, the humanitarian community has been mobilizing a coordinated response to the worst drought situation Somalia has seen in 25 years (affecting the whole of the Horn of Africa), affecting an estimated 1.7 million people, mostly in the Central and Southern regions of Somalia. This suggests a need for *continued focus on short term relief planning alongside medium to long term planning in Somalia*. In recent years the development-recovery-relief categorization has proved less popular with key stakeholders in Somalia. It is perceived by some donors as the reason for the proliferation of coordination fora and planning documentation with a corresponding risk of duplication, inefficiency and lack of synergy. There is a need for the UN to *address/manage this perception*.
- h) Recognizing the urgent need to make funding quickly available for recovery initiatives the UN has established *a UN joint fund* (The Interim Support Fund for Somalia) that offers to key stakeholders harmonized financial management, accounting and reporting on a single UN programme for Somalia. An appropriately modeled pool fund should greatly reduce administrative burdens on national counterparts, donors and the UN agencies, and allow greater focus on technical aspects of implementation. It is now time for the international community to engage fully with the TFG and TFIs about the purpose and modalities of the proffered multi-donor-trust fund that has been used in other post-conflict situations. The UNCT agreed at its monthly meeting of 8 June to do a one day inter-agency modeling exercise to help inform consequent discussions in external fora. A more immediate priority was identified to meet to establish a strategic approach to UN engagement with Somalia in the delivery of development assistance to the Somali people. This was the purpose of the meeting on 14 June at the Palacina Hotel Nairobi.

3) Recommendations

- a) *Negative perceptions*. There are several negative stakeholder perceptions surrounding UN engagement in Somalia including: the UN is not achieving anything, not sufficiently present in the field, is not reliable or trustworthy, the UN programme is managed from Nairobi and UN field staff are not empowered to engage fully with local and national authorities in the field and that there is a lack of respect for local and national partners.
- b) The precedent established in the delivery of development assistance to Somalia over the last 13 years is that planning and coordination has been largely managed by Nairobi-based non-governmental stakeholders. In order for the TFG to gain any level of credibility amongst Somalis and the international community *government ownership must be established as the departure point for all future engagement*. This will require:
 - A fundamental *change in mind-set* is required amongst all key stakeholders in order for the UN to develop a true partnership of equals. This could be partly managed through induction training and the establishment of a code of conduct which properly reflects this mind-set. *Partnership* must be established *throughout* the development cycle from planning to implementation and monitoring and reporting.

- *Parallel accountable and transparent engagement with TFG and local regional and sub-regional de facto authorities* e.g “Somaliland” (see paragraph 1 (d)), religious bodies, clans and civil society. This is necessary to achieve geographical outreach in programme delivery as the TFG has not established any extended level of popular support. In this respect the UNCT discussed the zonal approach to partnership in the delivery of assistance. In the final analysis it was agreed that a parallel approach was required whereby the UN transparently treated the TFG as the primary political partner alongside zonal and local partners.
 - *Development of government capacity* is required so that the government is able to manage the planning and coordination of development assistance as an equal partner.
 - A future UN Somalia programme must *simultaneously address the development of civil society and other organizations central to peace and reconciliation and the delivery of public services to Somalis* as part of its nation-building programme. This should be done with the strategic aim of ultimately bridging the accountability gap between central government, federal and regional administration and community based organizations.
 - UN and other development assistance must be institutionally *embedded within government structures*.
 - The UN programme requires a strategic focus on peace-building, rights based programming and nation-building which systematically accounts for the drivers of conflict in Somalia.
 - The UN should adhere to the OECD Principles on Engagement in Fragile States.
 - The UN should increase advocacy, consultation and exchange of information with the *national and regional authorities through field based structures*. As regards development data - we need to have it, manage the quality of it and deliver it efficiently to all key stakeholders.
- c) ***Rigorous strategic prioritization and speed in delivery through effective inter-agency coordination.*** Funding is unlikely to become immediately available on the scale required to deliver the required programme of assistance for Somalia. In anticipation of an approved government-owned comprehensive development plan for Somalia (the Reconstruction and Development Plan) by the end of 2006, that satisfies the fundamental requirements of a CCA and UNDAF, the UNCT confirmed its commitment at its Annual Retreat in January 2006 *to develop in partnership with the TFG and other key stakeholders a single integrated UN development plan outlining its contribution to the RDP as soon as possible after the completion of the RDP and ideally by March 2007*. The UNCT used the model of the HIV/AIDS UNISP and its Theme Group as an example of best practice in respect of the mechanics of joint working. Notably, this requires the Three Ones approach, One Plan, One Coordination Mechanism and One Monitoring and Evaluation System. The extrapolation of this approach across several clusters will require amongst other things
- Local structures for technical engagement with national counterparts at the technical/thematic level (e.g National Aids Commissions, local UN Theme Groups etc)
 - Effective advocacy of UN Reform Agenda and the mechanics of delivering UN Reform at country level
 - An increased development coordination resource to manage the development of a joint programme cycle (inter-agency and external consultation and participation, development of UN Transitional Plan, data management, technical and financial reporting etc)
 - Movement of coordination away from Nairobi and into the field with secretariats to support coordination in the field.
 - Development of a single coordination proposal from the Office of the Resident Coordinator.
 - Cascaded training to all UN staff in the fundamentals of the UN Reform Agenda. A presentation on joint programming will be delivered at the next UNCT.
- d) The UN should ***empower field staff*** with liaison and decision making responsibilities. This will require, amongst other things a quantitative and qualitative increase in international and national field staff and improved incentives for field staff and improved standards of welfare and living for field staff in strategic programme locations (especially improved offices and housing and shorter R&R cycle) in order to attract a greater number of interested applicants. This will require:
- Effective local UNCT structures

- A survey on living conditions in the field in strategic locations in order to assess upgrading required.
 - UN agencies to deliver a planned staffing profile for all field locations.
 - Establishment of surge capacity and greater use of UNVs in the field as well as increased programme engagement with the diaspora.
 - Nairobi based staff working on the Somalia programme need to spend greater amounts of time in the field engaging with their counterparts. More specifically the group committed to delivery of at least three Nairobi UNCT meetings in field on an annual basis.
 - A new profile of staff who have experience working in the transitional period in other post-conflict countries as well as familiarity with the partnership approach.
- e) There is a need for *more effective travel and logistics* to prevent long uncomfortable periods of travel to strategic locations such as Hargeisa. While it was acknowledged that the current service is based on a contract negotiated at headquarters the UNCT agreed the necessity to establish a dialogue on UN issues relating to the suitability of the service for increased field engagement. UNHCR agreed to lead on establishing an inter-agency profile of required service to present for discussion to the UNCAS board.
- f) The UNCT acknowledged a need to consider a planned and *phased return of presence/engagement with Mogadishu*. This will require support from Headquarters as well as sufficient resourcing. This should be developed through the UN interagency operations group (Somalia Operations Group).
- g) **Communications.** Adhere to the *One Voice* approach. All agencies and their staff should be able and willing to represent the view of the UN in any fora. This will require efficient communication of all developments internally and externally as appropriate. While we have an inter-agency communication strategy it needs to be properly resourced. More specifically the establishment of a UN web-site was suggested as well as the greater use of the BBC Somali Service. See also (3(c)bullet 6 on cascaded induction training)

RN/22 June 2006

Annex 1 PARTICIPANTS/Distribution UNCT Meeting on Engagement with Somalia 14 June 2006

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Annex 2 OUTLINE

UNCT Somalia Workshop

engagement, presence and visibility

14 June 2006, Palacina Hotel, Dennis Pritt Road, Nairobi

Aim of Workshop: To establish a joint UN Somalia strategic approach with regard to engagement in Somalia		
Time Required (mins)	Session 1: Establish strategic approach/parameters to planning exercise	Lead
0830 hrs	Finalise Workshop approach and timetable	UNRCS
	The UNRHC's perspective	UNRHC
	A Somali perspective	UNICEF
	What type of programme do we want to deliver in Somalia and how do we deliver it?	UNRCS
	A programme developed and delivered in partnership with the government	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Developing government capacity, developing government systems 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The zonal approach 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consultation, participation and information sharing 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Empowering field staff 	
	An integrated/joint UN programme for Somalia	UNAIDS
	IASC Approach	UNOCHA
	Outreach	
	Strategic Focus of programme and Strategic Locations (humanitarian and development)	UNDP/UNOCHA
	Managing operational issues	UNDP
	Quality and quantity of personnel	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Attracting the right caliber of person to field posts (and keeping them) 	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security and Standard of Living 	
	Visibility and Perception of UN Programme	UNDP/JNA
	Efficiency: Logistics, travel, communications systems	
	Resourcing	
	Clarify emerging strategic approach and Agree Next Steps	UNRC
1530 hrs	Close Workshop	UNRC